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INTRODUCTION
Spending on pharmaceutical drugs in the United States is ex-
orbitantly high, amounting to $325 billion in 2015—just under 2
percent of GDP.1 And this spending is rising: prescription drug
spending is projected to increase by over 6 percent per year over the
next decade.2 One of the factors most responsible for these high
medical and pharmaceutical costs is the price of brand drugs.
Although branded drugs compose only 11 percent of prescriptions
in the United States, that 11 percent is responsible for 73 percent
of total American drug spending.3 Soaring pharmaceutical costs are 
not a new problem, either; Congress’s strongest attempt to decrease
spending on pharmaceutical drugs occurred in 1984, when Congress
passed the Hatch-Waxman Act4 to encourage the entry of generic
drugs into the pharmaceutical marketplace.5 Generic drugs are of-
ten substantially cheaper than their branded counterparts, as their
average cost across the industry is 80-85 percent lower than brand
drugs.6 Yet, when the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, approx-
imately 150 brand drugs whose patent protection had expired faced
no generic drug competition.7 Therefore, it is no surprise that Con-
gress, seeking to provide “low-cost, generic drugs for millions of
Americans,”8 targeted accelerating market entry of generic drugs as
a way to decrease rising pharmaceutical costs.9
1. Peter Olson & Louise Sheiner, The Hutchins Center Explains: Prescription Drug
Spending, BROOKINGS: UP FRONT (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/
2017/04/26/the-hutchins-center-explains-prescription-drug-spending/ [https://perma.cc/ PQ8F-
5GL7].
2. See id.
3. See Generic Drugs Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. [hereinafter Facts], https://www.
fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/genericdrugs/ucm167
991.htm [https://perma.cc/XD5U-WFAM] (last updated June 4, 2018).
4. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
5. See 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (the goal of the Act was
to provide “low-cost, generic drugs for millions of Americans”). 
6. Facts, supra note 3.
7. Michael A. Carrier & Brenna Sooy, Five Solutions to the REMS Patent Problem, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1661, 1663-64 (2017) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 17 (1984)).
8. 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
9. See Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust
Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential Generic Competitors, 67 FLA. L. REV. 977, 981-82
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The Hatch-Waxman Act has been fairly successful in encourag-
ing generic competition.10 But recently, generics have encountered
an additional hurdle to entering the market. In 2007, Congress
passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
(FDAAA), which granted the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
the authority to require drug manufacturers to create a Risk Eval-
uation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) to ensure the safety of their
products.11 The drug manufacturer designs a REMS program to
restrict the distribution of potentially dangerous drugs by limiting
drug access to selected and approved distributors.12 However, many
brand-name drug manufacturers have designed their REMS pro-
grams in such a way that prevents generic drug manufacturers from
obtaining access to the branded drugs.13 Generic drug manufactur-
ers need access to samples of the branded drugs to develop and test
their generic drugs for bioequivalence with the branded drug, in
order to qualify their products for fast-tracked regulatory approval
through the FDA’s Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).14
Without being able to test for bioequivalence, the generic drug
manufacturers face significant barriers to market entry.15 As ge-
nerics are unable to enter the pharmaceutical product’s market, the
lack of competition leads to higher prices because the branded drug
manufacturer retains a monopoly over the market, even if the
company’s patent has expired.16 To overcome this regulatory side
effect, generics have increasingly turned to the courts and antitrust
law to enjoin brands to provide them with samples of the brand
drugs.17
(2015); Donald S. Lee, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: Players or Pariahs in Health Care Re-
form?, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 90-91 (1993).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
11. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 505-1,
121 Stat. 823, 926-39 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012)).
12. See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II. 
14. See infra notes 22-27, 60-62 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.
16. ALEX BRILL, MATRIX GLOBAL ADVISORS, LOST PRESCRIPTION DRUG SAVINGS FROM USE
OF REMS PROGRAMS TO DELAY GENERIC MARKET ENTRY 1 (2014),  https://www.gphaonline.
org/media/cms/REMS_Studyfinal_July2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/UU5E-LVNF].
17. See infra text accompanying note 151.
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This Note argues that brand drug manufacturers have manipu-
lated REMS to engage in anticompetitive behavior that undermines
the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act and hurts the public interest
by preventing market entry of generic competitors. Part I will give
an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and the FDAAA to examine
the legislative origins of Congress’s regulations of the pharmaceu-
tical industry affecting generic market entry. Part II will explain
why brands’ refusal to share samples with generics has anticompeti-
tive effects, and will highlight the economic consequences that have
resulted from this behavior. 
Part III will address the legislative history behind the FDAAA,
focusing on the limitation of REMS “block[ing]” behavior under
§ 355-1(f)(8),18 and will detail how Congress has attempted to clarify
brands’ duties under REMS but has failed to issue firm legislation
on the matter. Part III contends that this lack of clear congression-
al intent has played a large role in why the FDA has acted with ex-
treme passivity towards generics’ allegations of brands’ uses of
REMS to justify anticompetitive behavior. Part III will also argue
that while the FDA has seemingly requested the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) to intervene on behalf of generics’ antitrust
claims, the FDA is better positioned to regulate REMS disputes in
a way that relieves antitrust concerns and streamlines the ANDA
approval process while appropriately resolving safety concerns.
Part IV will survey possible antitrust remedies available to ge-
nerics, and will identify the refusal-to-deal doctrine under Section
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act as the most appropriate avenue for
judicial analysis. After analyzing Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the refusal-to-deal doctrine, Part IV argues that current refusal-to-
deal doctrine and analysis will not impose antitrust liability on
brands because brands’ refusals to deal are motivated by a legiti-
mate business purpose of avoiding tort and product liability. Absent
an evidentiary showing of anticompetitive motivation, generics’ lit-
igation against brands for their refusal to sell samples will likely
prove unsuccessful.
However, Part V will explain why REMS provides an ideal con-
text for courts to impose a new exception to the right of firms to
18. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
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refuse to deal with competitors. Under the analysis set forth by Ver-
izon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,19
the FDA and the REMS regulatory framework have fallen short of
effectively providing a regulatory antitrust check. This failure has
opened the door for the judiciary to intervene and apply antitrust
principles to alleged anticompetitive uses of REMS. Part V will
ultimately conclude that courts should step through this opening
and apply antitrust scrutiny within the REMS context— an area of
the pharmaceutical industry currently beset by a vacuum of anti-
competitive liability.
I. LEGISLATIVE ORIGINS OF REMS
Studying the origins and purposes behind the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the FDAAA—which, respectively, created procedures govern-
ing generic manufacturer entry into the pharmaceutical market20
and REMS21—lays the foundation of understanding why the status
quo of brands’ use of REMS is problematic.
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
The primary provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act22 enabled a
generic to circumvent the FDA’s strict, time-consuming, and ex-
pensive testing requirements for a new drug23 by permitting ge-
nerics to file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) instead
of the typical New Drug Application (NDA).24 ANDAs allowed gener-
ics to “piggy-back”25 on a brand-name drug’s successful application—
including expensive safety and effectiveness studies26—if they show-
ed their generic drug was bioequivalent to the brand drug.27 In
19. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
20. See infra Part I.A.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012)).
23. See Carrier & Sooy, supra note 7, at 1664.
24. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(viii) (2012).
25. See Carrier & Sooy, supra note 7, at 1664-65.
26. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990).
27. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY 5 (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-
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exchange for the increase in generic competition Congress created
through ANDAs, the Act extended the patent term for brand
drugs.28
In an ANDA application, the generic must certify one of the fol-
lowing four conditions: (I) a patent for the listed drug has not been
filed; (II) the existing patent on the listed drug has expired; (III) the
specific date on which a patent for a listed drug will expire; or
(IV) the patent for the listed drug is invalid or will not be infringed
by the generic’s manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug.29 A
filing under condition IV is called a “Paragraph IV certification,”30
and the first successful Paragraph IV ANDA applicant is awarded
180 days of generic exclusivity on the market.31 However, once a ge-
neric has filed a Paragraph IV certification with both the FDA and
the brand drug manufacturer, the brand may file an infringement
action against the generic,32 which leads to an automatic thirty-
month stay of the generic’s ANDA approval.33
State drug product selection (DPS) laws, which are in effect in all
fifty states, support the Hatch-Waxman Act’s effort to aid generic
market entry.34 DPS laws allow—and often require—pharmacists to
substitute generic drugs for prescribed brand drugs if the generic
drug is rated by the FDA as bioequivalent to the brand drug.35 DPS
laws are critical for lowering consumers’ pharmaceutical expenses,
because even though branded drugs comprise only 11 percent of pre-
scriptions in the United States, this 11 percent is responsible for 73
percent of drug spending.36 Together, the Hatch-Waxman Act and
state DPS laws have also been largely successful in increasing ge-
neric market entry: while generics constituted only 19 percent of the
prescription drug market in 1984, as of 2014, they represented 89
prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK8A-PSDG].
28. See Butler, supra note 9, at 982.
29. See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
30. See Jordan Paradise, REMS As a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma Hijacking Drug
Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43, 51 (2015).
31. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
32. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 51.
33. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
34. See Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust Framework, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8 (2017).
35. See id.
36. See Facts, supra note 3.
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percent of the market.37 A study by the Generic Pharmaceutical As-
sociation calculated that generics led to savings of almost $1.5 tril-
lion for consumers between 2006 and 2015.38
B. The FDAAA
Section 505-1(a)(1) of the FDAAA empowers the FDA to require
drug manufacturers to comply with REMS for certain drugs the
FDA deems sufficiently hazardous.39 The FDA considers (1) the size
of population likely to use the drug; (2) the seriousness of the dis-
ease the drug alleviates; (3) the drug’s expected benefit to con-
sumers; (4) the expected duration of treatment; (5) the seriousness
of known or possible adverse effects; and (6) the drug’s novelty, as
factors affecting the need for a REMS program.40 The FDA may re-
quire a REMS before a drug enters the market or after the drug has
hit the market, if new evidence of risk appears.41 Because the drug
manufacturer uniquely designs each REMS according to FDA re-
quirements based upon the drug’s risks,42 some REMS are therefore
more restrictive than others.43 REMS generally require a manufac-
turer to provide a medication guide for patients, communication to
distributors and health care providers describing the drug’s risks,
“limitations on labeling, promotion, and prescribing [of the drug] in
order to assure safe use by patients,” and a REMS implementation
plan.44 More restrictive REMS programs involve elements to assure
safe use (ETASU), which “restrict a drug’s distribution and affect
how it can be sold” and to whom.45
37. See GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N, 2016 GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS & ACCESS IN THE UNITED
STATES REPORT 5 (2016), http://www.gphaonline.org/media/generic-drug-savings-2016/index.
html [https://perma.cc/J9HW-L3PV].
38. See id. at 6.
39. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1 (2012).
40. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RISK EVALUATION & MITIGATION
STRATEGIES (REMS), 6 (2007) http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/
UCM328784.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BL3-5TTD].
41. See id. at 5.
42. See § 355-1.
43. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 6.
44. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 46 (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 355-1(c)-(f)).
45. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 7 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(2)(D)(ii)).
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Under the FDAAA, if a brand drug requires REMS, then any
corresponding generic drugs seeking market entry under the ex-
pedited ANDA application must adhere to the brand’s REMS pro-
gram requirements.46 The FDAAA’s intent was that the brand and
the generic would collaborate to create a single shared REMS pro-
gram,47 but that has rarely borne out in practice: “many generic
companies are ... finding that brand manufacturers are unwilling to
work with them on the development of single, shared REMS sys-
tems.”48 Fortunately, the FDAAA also grants discretion to the FDA
Commissioner49 to allow a generic to create its own REMS program
when either (1) the burden of creating the single shared REMS
system outweighs the benefits, or (2) the REMS program is pro-
tected by patent and the generic has been unsuccessful in attempts
to acquire a license.50
REMS is quickly becoming a fairly common staple of the phar-
maceutical industry: the FDA assigns REMS programs for approx-
imately 40 percent of new drugs.51 As of January 2017, there were
seventy-six approved REMS programs, and forty-two involved
ETASU.52 However, a 2013 report from the Department of Health
and Human Services Office of the Inspector General called into
question “the overall effectiveness of the REMS program,” as only
seven of then-forty-nine REMS programs were meeting the FDA’s
goals for improving drug safety.53
Congress designed the Hatch-Waxman Act to ease generic drug
entry into the market,54 and Congress included provisions creating
46. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 59.
47. See id.; Carrier & Sooy, supra note 7, at 1669.
48. Paradise, supra note 30, at 68.
49. The text of the statute grants this discretionary power to the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services, 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B) (2012), but in practice
the decision to waive the shared REMS program lies with the FDA Commissioner. See
Paradise, supra note 30, at 59.
50. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(i)(1)(B)(ii) (2012); Carrier & Sooy, supra note 7, at 1669.
51. See BRILL, supra note 16, at 2.
52. Carrier, supra note 34, at 7 (citing Approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strate-
gies (REMS), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/rems/
index.cfm?event=RemsDetails.page&REMS=17 [https://perma.cc/SNH2-EACQ]).
53. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FDA LACKS COM-
PREHENSIVE DATA TO DETERMINE WHETHER RISK EVALUATION AND MITIGATION STRATEGIES
IMPROVE DRUG SAFETY 22 (2013).
54. See 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
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REMS within the FDAAA to ensure the safety of hazardous drugs.55
However, these policy goals have been either thwarted or over-
shadowed by brands’ use of REMS to block generic entry into the
pharmaceutical market.56 A closer examination of how brands have
manipulated REMS, and the effects of this manipulation upon ge-
neric competitors and the market at large, is warranted.
II. BRAND DRUG MANUFACTURERS’ USE OF REMS TO BLOCK
GENERIC ENTRY
REMS programs are designed to limit access to potentially dan-
gerous drugs.57 However, brand drug manufacturers have used
REMS’ distribution limitations to deny generic competitors the
access to samples of the brand drugs that generics need to achieve
ANDA certification.58 As a result, generics are unable to complete
bioequivalence testing, which creates a barrier to generic entry into
the market resulting in negative economic consequences for the
general American public.59
A. Bioequivalence Testing and Generics’ Lack of Access to Samples
For both ANDA and DPS reasons, it is essential that generics
prove that their generic drug is bioequivalent to the brand drug.60
Bioequivalence occurs when the “rate and extent of absorption in
the body” of the drug is equivalent between the brand and generic
drug.61 Generics must complete bioequivalence testing themselves,
and are able to prove bioequivalence only after obtaining samples
of the brand drug that they can test against their generic version of
55. See supra Part I.B.
56. See infra Part II.
57. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
59. See infra Parts II.A-B.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 27, 35.
61. Carrier, supra note 34, at 35 (citing U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR DRUG EVAL-
UATION & RESEARCH, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVAL-
UATIONS (36th ed. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079068.
htm [https://perma.cc/VQ8Y-75dd]).
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the drug.62 Usually, generics are able to obtain samples of the
brand drug for bioequivalence testing through normal purchase
and distribution channels, such as the brand drug’s wholesaler(s).63
However, because a central purpose of REMS is to limit access to
the potentially hazardous drug,64 REMS often include “provisions
barring distributors and wholesalers from selling the drug to en-
tities without approval under the REMS.”65 As the brand drug
manufacturer is responsible for creating and running their own
REMS program,66 generics must either get the brand to list them as
approved entities, or ask to purchase samples of the drug from the
brand manufacturer directly.67 REMS therefore gives brand drug
manufacturers tremendous power over the ability of their generic
competitors to meet FDA market entry regulation requirements.
B. REMS’ Negative Effect on Generic Market Entry and
Subsequent Economic Harm
Unsurprisingly, brands have taken advantage of this power to
block or slow down their generic competition. A prime example of a
brand using REMS to refuse to share samples occurred as early as
2008, when Celgene refused to sell samples of their brand drugs
Thalomid and Revlimid to Lannett, a generic pharmaceutical man-
ufacturer.68 Both Thalomid and Revlimid were subject to extensive
ETASU.69 Although Lannett sued Celgene, alleging that Celgene’s
62. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 9, at 983 (citing Roxane Laboratories, Inc.’s Answer,
Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim Complaint at 22, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc.,
No. 1:12-cv-05743-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. Nov. 27, 2012)).
63. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 34, at 9.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
65. Lauren Battaglia, Risky Conduct with Risk Mitigation Strategies? The Potential
Antitrust Issues Associated with REMS, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRON., Mar. 2013, at 28,
https://www.hlregulation.com/files/2013/10/Lauren-Battaglia-article1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TV63-MQWA].
66. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 53, at 1 n.3.
67. See Battaglia, supra note 65, at 28.
68. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 64.
69. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THALOMID B (THALIDOMIDE) 1-7, http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/
UCM222649.pdf [https://perma.cc/67C7-KG5Y] (last modified Sept. 2014); U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., REVLIMID R (LENALIDOMIDE) 1-7, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DrugSafety/
PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/UCM222644.pdf [https://perma.
cc/R55S-WK6W] (last modified Feb. 2015).
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refusal to allow Lannett to buy samples violated antitrust law, the
suit was never decided on the merits and ended in settlement.70
Lannett’s complaint was just the tip of the iceberg; as of June 2016,
over 100 generics have complained that they have not been able to
conduct bioequivalence testing due to lack of access to brand drug
samples.71 A 2014 study estimated that brand refusal to grant ge-
nerics access to their drug samples under the auspices of REMS dis-
tribution limitations costs consumers $5.4 billion per year.72
III. INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE TO ADDRESS GENERICS’ REMS
CONCERNS
Given that brands’ manipulative use of REMS both largely
thwarts the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act and has resulted in
economic harm to consumers,73 it raises the question: has Congress
or the FDA addressed and curtailed such behavior? While members,
and even bodies of Congress have attempted to enact legislation
that would close the REMS loophole,74 the FDA has refrained from
issuing any effective regulation on REMS abuses,75 and has even
tried to shirk adjudication and enforcement of alleged REMS ma-
nipulation onto the FTC.76 This Part examines these repeated fail-
ures by both Congress and the FDA to sufficiently address generic
manufacturers’ concerns of brands’ manipulation of REMS, and ar-
gues that the FDA is the designated REMS regulatory body, and is
in a better position than the FTC to regulate all aspects of REMS,
including alleged anticompetitive behavior.
70. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 64 (citing Erin Coe, Lannett Cuts Deal with Celgene
in Thalomid Antitrust Case, LAW 360 (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.law360.com/articles/291483/
lannett-cuts-deal-with-celgene-in-thalomid-antitrust-case).
71. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 3.
72. See BRILL, supra note 16, at 1.
73. See supra Parts II.A-B.
74. See infra Part III.A.
75. See infra Part III.B.
76. See infra notes 133-35 and accompanying text. 
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A. Repeated Congressional Inaction
Members of Congress are aware that brands are using REMS
as a tactic to block or delay generic competition and market entry.
Representatives and academics alike have argued that brands’ re-
fusal to provide samples contravenes the language of the FDAAA
and the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.77 Many of these REMS
critics point to § 355-1(f)(8) of the FDAAA as the source of their
argument.78 Section 355-1(f)(8) acts as a “[l]imitation” on REMS,
stating that “[n]o holder of an approved covered application shall
use any [ETASU] required by the Secretary under this subsection
to block or delay approval of an [ANDA] application.”79 However,
the provision “does not construe the type of conduct that is consid-
ered to block or delay, nor does it include penalties for violations.”80
Congress has repeatedly failed to enact legislation clarifying—or
giving the FDA enforcement power upon—§ 355-1(f)(8).81 In 2007,
2012, 2014, and 2016, Congress considered language requiring
brands to provide or sell generics samples of their drugs for the pur-
pose of bioequivalence testing; each time, Congress failed to enact
any changes.82
In addition to containing § 355-1(f)(8),83 House Bill 2900—the
first version of the 2007 FDAAA that was passed by the House—
would have explicitly required brands to sell their drug to generic
companies at market price for the purposes of bioequivalence test-
ing.84 House Bill 2900 provided that if the generic agreed to pay
market value for the samples and to abide by the drug’s REMS and
ETASU standards, then the brand had to sell “a sufficient quantity
77. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 36; Carrier & Sooy, supra note 7, at 1670-71; Paradise,
supra note 30, at 46; Shashank Upadhye & Braden Lang, The FDA and Patent, Antitrust, and
Property Takings Laws: Strange Bedfellows Useful to Unblock Access to Blocked Drugs, 20
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 84, 90 (2014); Christopher Megaw, Note, Reviving Essential Facilities
to Prevent REMS Abuses, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 103, 104-05 (2013); infra notes 97-99
and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., Paradise, supra note 30, at 60-62, 61 nn.94-95, 62 n.99.
79. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
80. Paradise, supra note 30, at 61.
81. See infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text.
83. § 355-1(f)(8).
84. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 11 n.57 (citing Food and Drug Administration Amend-
ments Act of 2007, H.R. 2900, 110th Cong. § 505-1(f)(6) (2007)).
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of drug to conduct bioequivalence testing.”85 Although the House
passed House Bill 2900 on July 11, 2007, the Senate took no action
on it.86 Two months later, on September 19, 2007, the House passed
House Bill 3580.87 House Bill 3580 was substantially similar to
House Bill 2900, but it omitted the language explicitly obligating
brands to sell drug samples to generics for bioequivalence testing.88
The Senate passed House Bill 3580 without amendment, and it
became law less than two weeks after its initial passage by the
House.89
In 2012, Congress considered the Food and Drug Administration
Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (FDASIA).90 The Senate version
of the FDASIA, Senate Bill 3187, contained language ordering that
“if a drug is a covered drug, no [ETASU] shall prohibit, or be con-
strued or applied to prohibit, supply of such drug to any eligible
drug developer for the purpose of conducting testing necessary to
support an [ANDA] application.”91 Although the Senate passed
Senate Bill 3187 on May 24, 2012,92 the language quoted above was
dropped when the House made its revisions to the bill, and the
Senate thereafter passed the House’s version of the FDASIA with-
out the provision.93 Notably, the Senate’s legislative history neither
explains nor mentions that the Senate dropped the provision when
it chose to pass the House’s version of the FDASIA.94
Two years later, a House bill introduced in September 2014 again
sought to enact legislation that would clarify brands’ obligation to
85. H.R. 2900, 110th Cong. § 505-1(f)(6) (2007).
86. See H.R. 2900 (110th): Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2900 [https://perma.cc/ZPE9-YCDS].
87. Id.
88. Compare Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
121 Stat. 823 (2007), with H.R. 2900 § 505-1(f)(6).
89. See H.R. 3580 (110th): Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3580 [https://perma.cc/S5R4-JAK7].
90. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, S. 3187, 112th Cong.
(as passed by Senate, May 24, 2012).
91. Id. § 1131(a).
92. See S. 3187 (112th): Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3187 [https://perma.cc/8PN8-KVCX].
93. See Megaw, supra note 77, at 116.
94. See Upadhye & Lang, supra note 77, at 99.
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provide generics access to brand drugs for testing purposes.95
Section 3(a) of House Bill 5657—the Fair Access for Safe and Time-
ly Generics Act of 2014—proposed that a brand drug manufacturer
may not “adopt, impose, or enforce” any condition of REMS “that
restricts or has the effect of restricting the supply of such covered
product to an eligible product developer for development or testing
purposes.”96 Additionally, House Bill 5657 empowered the FDA to
grant injunctive relief and damages against a brand manufacturer
should it violate the provision,97 and it established “commercially
reasonable, market-based prices” as the standard for sample pur-
chases between brands and generics.98 But yet again, Congress did
not enact language of this kind into law, as no further action was
taken on the bill after it was introduced and subsequently referred
to the House Subcommittee on Health.99
In 2016, the Senate became the legislative body to most recently
attempt to require brand drug manufacturers to provide generics
with samples for testing.100 The bill, known as the Creating and Re-
storing Equal Access to Equivalent Samples (CREATES) Act of
2016, enlists the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
act as a middleman between the brand manufacturer and the ge-
neric seeking access to samples of the brand drugs.101 If a generic
has been denied access to a brand’s drugs because of REMS, the
generic can apply to the HHS Secretary requesting access, and
within ninety days the Secretary grants the generic authorization
to obtain the drug samples if the generic has instituted sufficient
safety precautions.102
In the hearing for the bill, Senators Leahy and Grassley explicitly
called out brands’ refusal to share samples under REMS limitations,
95. See Fair Access for Safe and Timely Generics Act of 2014, H.R. 5657, 113th Cong.
(2014).
96. Id. § 505-2(b).
97. See id. § 505-2(f)(2).
98. Id. § 505-2(c).
99. See H.R. 5657 - FAST Generics Act of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5657/all-actions [https://perma.cc/UU7Z-BJDR].
100. See CREATES Act of 2016, S. 3056, 114th Cong. (2016).
101. Id. § 3(b)(1)(B)(ii).
102. Id. §§ 3(b)(1)(B)(ii)(I)-(II).
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with Senator Grassley labelling it a “misuse[ ]” of REMS.103 Accord-
ing to Senator Leahy, brands’ refusal to provide samples to generics
constituted a “simple delay tactic [that] uses regulatory safeguards
as a weapon to block competition.”104 Senator Grassley claimed this
was “in violation of FDA regulations and the Hatch Waxman Act.”105
Despite this vigor by members of the Senate,106 however, Congress
has taken no action on the bill in over a year, and it appears dead.107
Even though Congress has not enacted the CREATES Act, it is
worth noting that in its findings, the Act cites the testimony of both
the Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search108 and the FTC Chairwoman109 to demonstrate the problems
that REMS has created for generic market entry. Furthermore, the
text of the bill—while not discounting the potential of antitrust law
to address the issue of brands blocking generic access to their drugs
through REMS—finds that “a more tailored legal pathway”—such
as congressional legislation—is the most efficient and effective way
103. The CREATES Act: Ending Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring
Drug Price Competition: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and
Consumer Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong. (2016) (statement of Sen. Chuck
Grassley, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
06-21-16%20Grassley%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/UY4J-TJMB].
104. Id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Judiciary Comm.), https://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-21-16%20Leahy%20Statement%202.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9G5E-XQP6].
105. See id. (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
106. The CREATES Act, introduced and sponsored by Senator Leahy, also had eleven
cosponsors. See S.3056 - CREATES Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3056/cosponsors [https://perma.cc/7RC6-X3ZU].
107. See S.3056 - CREATES Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/senate-bill/3056/all-actions [https://perma.cc/V9PP-XJJ5] (the last action on
the bill was the previously cited hearing held on June 21, 2016 by the Senate’s Subcommittee
on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights).
108. See CREATES Act of 2016, S. 3056, 114th Cong. § 2(6) (2016) (“The Director of the
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research at the Food and Drug Administration has testified
that some manufacturers of covered products have used REMS and distribution restrictions
adopted by the manufacturer on their own behalf as reasons to not sell quantities of a covered
product to generic product developers, causing barriers and delays in getting generic products
on the market.”).
109. See id. § 2(7) (“The Chairwoman of the Federal Trade Commission has testified that
the Federal Trade Commission continues to be very concerned about potential abuses by
manufacturers of brand drugs of REMS or other closed distribution systems to impede gener-
ic competition.”).
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to resolve this problem that REMS created and to improve generic
entry and competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace.110
B. Absence of FDA Enforcement Against REMS Abuses
Although more than 100 generics have filed complaints alleging
that brands are using REMS to block their access to the brand’s
drug samples,111 the FDA has consistently refrained from holding
the position that the FDAAA requires the sale of samples between
brand and generic drug manufacturers for generic bioequivalence
testing and ANDA approval purposes.112 The FDA has repeatedly
written in REMS approval letters that brand manufacturers may
not use REMS “to block or delay approval of an [ANDA].”113 How-
ever, the FDA has been reluctant to elaborate upon what the afore-
mentioned blocking or delaying approval looks like in practice with-
in a brand’s operation of its REMS program.114
Nevertheless, the FDA’s position on this topic has slightly evol-
ved. In response to Lannett’s filing against Celgene115—one of the
first complaints by a generic over restricted access to a brand’s drug
samples116—the FDA filed a letter taking the position that while
Lannett would not be violating REMS safety measures by accessing
the drugs once it received approval for its bioequivalence study,
Celgene was not required to provide the requested samples.117 In
2012, again in response to a generic’s filing against Celgene, the
FDA showed signs of possibly leaning toward supporting generics
by stating that it “would not consider the provision of samples of
110. Id. § 2(9).
111. See supra text accompanying note 71.
112. See, e.g., Paradise, supra note 30, at 62 (“The FDA has thus far declined to take a
position on any of these [REMS] issues.”).
113. Butler, supra note 9, at 984 (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Judith A.
Racoosin, Deputy Dir. for Safety, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Beth Connelly,
Assoc. Dir. Regulatory Affairs, Purdue Pharma L.P. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.accessdata.
fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2013/019516Orig1s038ltr.pdf).
114. See supra note 112.
115. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
116. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 64.
117. See Butler, supra note 9, at 986, 986 n.53 (citing Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir.,
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Kumar Sekar, Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc. (Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.fdalawyersblog.com/FDA_CDER_to_Dr_Reddys_Laboratories_Inc_Partial_Petition
_Approval_and_Denial.pdf).
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a[ ] [REMS-regulated drug] to a generic manufacturer a REMS vi-
olation.”118 The FDA justified this position because holding other-
wise would “frustrate [the] Congressional intent”119 set forth in the
Hatch-Waxman Act to encourage generic market entry and com-
petition.120 Recent draft guidance released by the FDA has repeated
this position.121
Currently, the FDA is continuing to evaluate whether it should
issue general guidance and rulemaking on brands justifying their
unwillingness to sell drug samples to generics through REMS.122
Notably, before a Senate committee in 2016, the Director of the
FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research admitted that
brands have often used REMS to “block[ ] generic competition.”123
While a statement like this may be encouraging for those who wish
the FDA to identify brand behavior as violating § 355-1(f)(8), this
statement did not lead to any new FDA rulemaking or enforcement
of § 355-1(f)(8). Given that the FDA did not act after acknowledging
the very “block[ing]” activity the FDAAA seeks to limit,124 this sig-
nals that the FDA has no intention of evolving their position to the
point where they would be actively enforcing § 355-1(f)(8) against
brands that block generic access to their samples.
118. Paradise, supra note 30, at 66 (quoting Original Complaint at 12, Mylan Pharms. Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014)).
119. See id. at 66-67.
120. See supra Part I.A.
121. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 67 (citing FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE:
HOW TO OBTAIN A LETTER FROM FDA STATING THAT BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDY PROTOCOLS
CONTAIN SAFETY PROTECTIONS COMPARABLE TO APPLICABLE REMS FOR RLD (Dec. 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/
UCM425662.pdf).
122. See Ed Silverman, Share and Share Alike? Not If It’s a REMS, DRUGS.COM (Dec. 2013),
https://www.drugs.com/clinical_trials/share-share-alike-not-if-s-rems-16362.html [https://
perma.cc/AW9F-E8WU].
123. Carrier, supra note 34, at 44 (alterations in original) (quoting Generic Drug User Fee
Amendments: Accelerating Patient Access to Generic Drugs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, 114th Cong. at 1:03:09-22 (2016), https://www.c-span.org/
video/?403817-1/hearing-generic-drug-approval-process-accessibility&start=3777 [https://
perma.cc/9AU8-38AU] (statement of Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation &
Research)).
124. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
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C. REMS Enforcement: The Role of the FDA or the FTC?
Adding to the complexity of this issue within REMS—and likely
an additional reason why the FDA has largely been inactive on this
matter—is the uncertainty over what type of authority the FDA has
to enforce § 355-1(f)(8) in the FDAAA.125 While the FDAAA seeks to
direct brands and generics to create a shared REMS program,126 and
(ostensibly) places limitations on brands’ use of REMS to “block or
delay approval” of generic ANDAs,127 the FDAAA lacks any remedial
scheme.128 The FDAAA “provides no direction” on “whether and to
what extent the FDA has any authority” to achieve these afore-
mentioned ends.129 Commenting on the FDA’s authority under the
FDAAA, a HHS Report noted that the FDA even lacks “the author-
ity to take enforcement actions against sponsors that do not include
all information requested in FDA [REMS] assessment plans.”130 It
is therefore no surprise the FDA remains hesitant to take an active
enforcement role in a controversial REMS issue that touches on
antitrust concerns far more than safety or health concerns.
Instead, the FDA has opted to shift resolution of generic man-
ufacturers’ claims against brand manufacturers to the FTC. In
August 2013, the FDA answered a citizen petition asking the FDA
to, among other things, expand on § 355-1(f)(8) by explicitly issuing
regulatory guidance that brands shall not use REMS to block or
delay generic competition.131 The FDA replied that § 355-1(f)(8) is
not a “safety-related element[ ],” and that “issues related to ensur-
ing that marketplace actions ... do not block competition would be
best addressed by the FTC.”132 Two months later (October 2013),
in response to a citizen petition over a different FDAAA REMS
125. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 61-62 (“It is unclear ... whether and what type of
authority the FDA or the courts have to enforce the limitation in the statute.”).
126. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
127. § 355-1(f)(8).
128. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 36-37 (citing S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 114TH CONG.,
SUDDEN PRICE SPIKES IN OFF-PATENT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: THE MONOPOLY BUSINESS MODEL
THAT HARMS PATIENTS, TAXPAYERS, AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 117 n.733 (2016)).
129. Paradise, supra note 30, at 68-69; see also supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
130. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 53, at 22.
131. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Kumar
Sekar, Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Inc., supra note 117, at 1.
132. Id. at 7.
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requirement,133 the FDA wrote “[t]o the extent that ... there may be
antitrust issues ... we suggest [the drug manufacturer] consult with
the FTC.”134
The FDA’s continual inaction has indicated its desire to either
wait for Congress to enact additional legislation relating to REMS,
or to let the FTC handle any enforcement resulting from brands
using REMS to block generic bioequivalence testing, ANDA ap-
proval, and eventual generic market entry.135 Essentially, the FDA
would doubt its authority to act even if it became certain that brand
manufacturers were intentionally using REMS to block generics
from receiving ANDA approval. The FDA has been too timid. The
Hatch-Waxman Act granted the FDA general rulemaking authority
to institute regulations furthering the goal of the Act: to ease ge-
neric drug entry into the pharmaceutical market.136
Additionally, the FDAAA’s focus on REMS and safety does not
bind the FDA’s hands; as the FDA stated in its draft guidance to
the industry, “the provision of samples of a[ ] [drug controlled by
a REMS program] to a generic manufacturer” that meets corre-
sponding safety requirements does not constitute a REMS viol-
ation.137 REMS programs were created and required by the FDAAA
to ensure that the drug’s benefits outweigh its safety risks.138 So
long as the generic meets the same safety standards as the brand
does—which generics are required to do139—the FDA should have
no worries about acting in accordance with the Hatch-Waxman Act
and the FDAAA’s legislative purposes by prescribing regulations
that require brands to sell their drug samples to generics for
133. The provision stated that, unless granted a waiver, brands and generics must
establish a shared REMS program. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(8)(i)(1)(B) (2012). 
134. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to William
Franzblau, Vice President, Prometheus Labs., Inc. 6 (Oct. 7, 2013), https://www.regulations.
gov/document?D=FDA-2013-P-0572-0003&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://
perma.cc/ARB2-VWQS].
135. See supra Part III.B.
136. See 130 CONG. REC. 24,427 (1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (expressing that the
goal of the Act was to provide “low-cost, generic drugs for millions of Americans”).
137. Paradise, supra note 30, at 66 (citing Original Complaint at 12, Mylan Pharms. Inc.
v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094 (D.N.J. Apr. 3, 2014)).
138. See Paradise, supra note 30, at 57.
139. See id. at 59 (“[T]he generic drug entering the market based on measures of
bioequivalence to [the brand drug] must also adhere to the [brand’s] REMS.”).
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bioequivalence testing and ANDA approval.140 “Based on the strong
legislative history, portraying a universal concern about anti-
competitive behavior and the goal of a vibrant generic drug market,
such regulation seems to be easily legally defensible.”141
Importantly, the FDA (or the FTC) does not decide the limits of
FDA jurisdiction over REMS issues, even of those REMS issues
which primarily center on anticompetitive concerns: Congress
does.142 Congressional intent regarding FDA regulatory and en-
forcement power over REMS abuses that frustrate generic ANDA
applications is muddied by repeated Congressional failures to enact
more specific language mandating generic access to brand drug
samples,143 and by the general lack of a remedial scheme govern-
ing REMS and FDAAA violations.144 However, channeling the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
v. Billing, “the FDA has authority to enforce its own rules.”145 The
rule prescribed in § 355-1(f)(8) prohibits using REMS “to block or
delay approval of an [ANDA] application,”146 and this rule must
necessarily be enforced by some governing institution. The FDA is
better equipped than the FTC to enforce § 355-1(f)(8), to terminate
brand manufacturer use of REMS in a way that blocks or delays
generic testing and ANDA approval, and to increase safe, low-cost
generic drug competition—the primary goals of the Hatch-Waxman
Act and the FDAAA. Yet the FDA’s decision to remain inactive in
enforcing § 355-1(f)(8) has pushed generics to seek remedies for
alleged REMS abuses through the courts.147
Both Congress and the FDA have remained inactive in fixing
REMS, which has resulted in limitations on generic market entry
140. See id. at 78.
141. Id.
142. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1002 (citing Independent Agencies and Government
Corporations, USA.GOV., http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.html). This is be-
cause Congress “creates independent agencies and thus [sets] the extent of their jurisdic-
tions.” Id. at 1002 n.199.
143. See supra Part III.A.
144. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 36-37 (citing S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, supra note
128, at 117 n.733 (2016)).
145. Butler, supra note 9, at 1002; see 551 U.S. 264, 285 (2007).
146. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
147. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 3, 3 n.2.
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and economic harm to American consumers.148 But, although the
political and regulatory processes have left generics unsatisfied, ge-
nerics have also sought reprieve through the court system.149 Due to
Congress’s and the FDA’s failures to remedy REMS’ anticompetitive
effects—or to at least create a regulatory pathway for effective ad-
judication of generics’ concerns over brands’ use of REMS—many
generic manufacturers have turned to litigation and antitrust law
as a means of acquiring the brand samples necessary to comply with
ANDA requirements to enter the market.150
IV. AN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF REMS: THE REFUSAL-TO-DEAL
DOCTRINE
As of June 2016, over 100 generics had complained that they had
not been able to conduct bioequivalence testing due to lack of access
to brand drug samples.151 However, potential antitrust liability for
brand refusal to provide samples for generic testing has only been
analyzed by courts in seven of these cases,152 and none of the cases
moved past the motion-to-dismiss phase before settling under un-
disclosed agreements.153 This Part analyzes the potential success of
antitrust claims for anticompetitive REMS activity under both
Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,154 and con-
cludes that current antitrust law is not an avenue to success for
148. See supra Parts III.A-B.
149. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
150. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
151. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 3, 3 n.2.
152. For a case-by-case analysis on the results of the seven cases, see id. at 12-20. For the
seven cases themselves, see In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., No. 16-cv-563, 2017 WL 36371
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter In re Suboxone II]; Transcript of Oral Opinion at 18-19,
Mylan Pharm. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-cv-02094-ES-MAH (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2014); In re
Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014) [hereinafter In re Suboxone I];
Natco Pharma Ltd. v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 14-3247(DWF/JSM), 2015 WL 5718398 (D. Minn.
Sept. 29, 2015); In re Thalomid & Revlimid Antitrust Litig., No. 14-6997(KSH)(CLW), 2015
WL 9589217 (D.N.J. Oct. 29, 2015); Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., No. 12-
5743(NLH/AMD), 2013 WL 5524078 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2013); Order Upon Consideration of De-
fendant Celgene Corp.’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss at 1, Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No.
2:08-cv-03920-TJS (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2011) [Lannett v. Celgene].
153. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 12.
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012).
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generics in their search for acquiring brand samples for bioequiva-
lence testing.
A. Section 1 Is Not a Source of Brand Antitrust Liability
There are two primary bases for non-merger antitrust claims in
the United States: Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.155
Section 1 makes illegal any agreement in restraint of trade156 when
the agreement’s anticompetitive effects157 are significant and out-
weigh any procompetitive justifications.158 However, Section 1 is an
unlikely and ineffective source of liability for REMS actions. A ge-
neric’s claim under Section 1 would likely argue that the brand
manufacturer entered into an agreement with its distributors to
withhold samples from the generic in restraint of trade.159 But
because REMS (and ETASU in particular) itself requires these
restrictions upon distribution of the drugs,160 courts could not rea-
sonably conclude that the brands have created an agreement with
the distributor for the anticompetitive goal of restraining trade, for
the REMS “restrictions on wholesale distribution ... are therefore
not imposed by the brand company at all.”161
B. Brands Hold Monopoly Power Under Section 2
Section 2 claims, on the other hand, warrant much closer at-
tention and analysis. Indeed, most antitrust cases involving denying
samples to generics arise under Section 2.162 Section 2 prohibits
monopolization in restraint of trade,163 which requires the brand to
both have monopoly power and to engage in exclusionary conduct to
obtain or maintain the monopoly.164 The Supreme Court has defined
155. Id.
156. Id. § 1.
157. At their core, anticompetitive effects are the three “evils” of increased prices, reduced
output, and/or reduced quality. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52 (1911).
158. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 21; Megaw, supra note 77, at 124.
159. See Megaw, supra note 77, at 123.
160. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
161. Megaw, supra note 77, at 123. But see Carrier, supra note 34, at 20-21.
162. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 20.
163. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
164. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
678 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:655
monopoly power as “the power to control prices or exclude competi-
tion,”165 and courts have looked to an entity’s market share and the
barriers to entry into that market to determine whether a defendant
holds sufficient monopoly power to constitute antitrust liability.166
In clarifying the scope of “market,” the Court held that “as a matter
of law, a single brand of a product ... [can] be a relevant market
under the Sherman Act,”167 a holding that lower courts have applied
to include a single branded drug.168 Because the patent system itself
purposefully institutes artificial and complete barriers to entry,169
and as such a patented drug should in theory hold 100 percent
market share, it therefore seems fairly clear that the brand man-
ufacturers holding patented REMS drugs would have monopoly
power under current antitrust law.170
It is worth noting, however, that this may not always be the case.
There may be another drug that is sufficiently similar in terms of
demand-side substitutability such that courts will find that the two
(or more) drugs constitute the same product market.171 The exis-
tence of substitutability only occurs rarely, though, when the drugs
still have active patent protection.172 But in these rare cases when
165. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
166. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 21.
167. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992).
168. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 22, 22 n.152; see also Geneva Pharms. Tech. Corp. v.
Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 2004) (defining the product market as only the
generic version of a drug, excluding even the brand version); New York v. Actavis, PLC, No.
14 Civ. 7473, 2014 WL 7015198, at *35 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014) (“[C]ourts have found a single
brand-name drug and its generic equivalents to be a relevant product market in cases where
the challenged conduct involves a branded drug manufacturer's effort to exclude generic com-
petition.”).
169. See, e.g., Thomas Meyers, Address at the Boston University Joural of Science and
Technology Law Symposium: Biotech Materials and Medical Devices in the New Millenium
(2000) (transcript available at 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 3, ¶ 19 (2000)).
170. This is not true as a matter of law, see Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] patent holder has no market power in any
relevant sense if there are close substitutes for the patented product.”); In re Indep. Serv.
Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“A patent alone does not dem-
onstrate market power.”), but rather a matter of practice. See infra notes 172-73 and ac-
companying text.
171. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (ruling that a product
market is defined by measuring the “cross-elasticity of demand” between the product and
potential substitutes for it).
172. See, e.g., M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 650 (2003) (summarizing that in all recent FTC challenges to patented
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sufficient substitutes do exist, the REMS drug will not have a 100
percent market share. Nevertheless, in such cases where substitutes
exist, it is plausible—if not likely—that the brand still will be con-
sidered a monopolist under Section 2. This is because even when
substitutes do exist for patented drugs, the product market remains
highly concentrated, and so it remains likely that the brand will
retain a high enough market share to possess market power.173
This inquiry into product market definition and market power is
an essential hurdle for any generic to pass over in its antitrust
claim.174 This is particularly true because the burden of proving
market power falls on the plaintiff,175 who in REMS antitrust cases
will invariably be the generic. However, because product market
definition is a largely factual inquiry,176 and in order to analyze the
more pressing issue of how courts should view brands’ use of REMS
as exclusionary conduct, the remainder of this Note will assume
that a generic has established a prima facie showing of the brand’s
market power under Section 2.
C. Jurisprudence of the Refusal-to-Deal Doctrine: Otter Tail,
Aspen Skiing, and Trinko
Monopoly power alone is not illegal under antitrust law. As Jus-
tice Scalia noted in Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, “[t]he mere possession of monopoly power ...
is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-
drugs, “the product market definition alleged [was] ... limited to the pioneer drug and its
generic equivalents”).
173. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN THE PHARMA-
CEUTICAL INDUSTRY 26 (2014), https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/
Competition-and-Antitrust-Issues-in-the-Pharmaceutical-IndustryFinal7.2.14.pdf [https://
perma.cc/RV4A-LEZD] (“Although the US pharmaceutical market as a whole is unconcen-
trated, the product market definition used for on-patent drugs is usually the therapeutic class
or indication, and at this level concentration can be a significant concern.”). The steep decline
in price that occurs following every additional generic entrant into the market is also strong
evidence of the high market concentration of patented brand drugs. See Generic Competition
and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm [https://perma.cc/XC78-88LX]
(last updated Nov. 28, 2017).
174. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 172, at 652.
175. See id. at 656.
176. See id. at 634 (“[M]arket definition issues are intensely factual.”).
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market system.... [M]onopoly power will not be found unlawful
unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive con-
duct.”177 This second prong of Section 2 antitrust claims—that the
entity must wield its monopoly power in restraint of trade by
engaging in exclusionary conduct—is governed in the REMS con-
text by the refusal-to-deal doctrine.178 The refusal-to-deal doctrine
represents the principle that there is generally no obligation upon
an entity to contract or deal with another party, including a com-
petitor.179 The Supreme Court has stated that refusal-to-deal cases
imposing liability exist only at the “outer boundary” of Section 2
liability.180 However, the Supreme Court has also established that
there are certain recognized exceptions to the refusal-to-deal doc-
trine that withdraw a monopolist’s protection from Section 2 lia-
bility and would obligate a monopolist to deal with another party.181
The three seminal Supreme Court cases explaining when monopol-
istic companies are required to deal with their competitors due to
antitrust concerns are Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,182 As-
pen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,183 and Trinko.184
Otter Tail involved an electric utility company that had monop-
olized the retail distribution of electricity in its service area, and
had then used its monopoly power to prevent a competitor electricity
distribution system from entering the retail market.185 Specifically,
Otter Tail refused to either sell its own energy to the competitor at
wholesale or to “wheel power” to the competitor from other suppliers
of wholesale energy.186 Otter Tail thereby prevented its competitor
from acquiring access to any electrical power, and so the competitor
was unable to provide power to its potential service communities.187
The Court held this exclusionary conduct violated Section 2 of the
177. 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
178. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 34, at 20, 22-23.
179. See Megaw, supra note 77, at 126.
180. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
181. See id. at 408-09 (“The leading case for § 2 liability based on refusal to cooperate with
a rival ... is Aspen Skiing”).
182. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
183. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
184. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
185. See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 368.
186. Id. at 371.
187. See id.
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Sherman Act.188 The Court required Otter Tail to deal with its com-
petitor despite Otter Tail’s claims of self-interest, stating that “[t]he
promotion of self-interest alone does not invoke the rule of reason to
immunize otherwise illegal conduct” when the self-interest at stake
is merely an interest in acquiring greater or continued monopolistic
control over the market.189 Notably, the Court found that Otter Tail
violated Section 2 even when Otter Tail had not engaged in any
prior dealings with the competitor, and the competitor was only a
mere “potential entrant[ ]” into the market.190
In Aspen Skiing, the Court significantly expanded upon the ra-
tionale behind the refusal-to-deal doctrine.191 Aspen Skiing revolved
around Aspen Skiing Company (Ski Co.) and Aspen Highlands Ski-
ing Corporation (Highlands), two competing ski resorts in Aspen,
Colorado, where Ski Co. held monopoly power over the skiing mar-
ket.192 Prior to the initiation of the lawsuit by Highlands, Ski Co.
and Highlands had contracted with one another to provide a joint
ski pass ticket that allowed customers to ski in Aspen resorts owned
by either company.193 However, after a dispute over revenue shar-
ing, Ski Co. discontinued the joint ticket.194 Furthermore, Ski Co.
refused to sell Highlands any Ski Co. ticket passes that Highlands
could sell to its customers who wished to purchase multiple-resort
passes, and refused to accept customers’ vouchers (paid for by High-
lands) that were equal to the price of a Ski Co. ticket.195 Despite
restating the “high value that we have placed on the right to refuse
to deal with other firms,”196 the Court held that Ski Co.’s refusal to
deal was not motivated by “efficiency” concerns or “valid business
reasons,” but constituted “predatory” action that violated Section
2.197 Analyzing the evidence, the Court specifically pointed out that
not only would selling Highland tickets and accepting Highland
customers’ vouchers have come at no cost to Ski Co., but also that
188. Id. at 380-81.
189. Id. at 380 (quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967)).
190. Id. at 377.
191. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985).
192. Id. at 587-88.
193. See id. at 589.
194. See id. at 592.
195. See id. at 592-94.
196. Id. at 601.
197. Id. at 605.
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Ski Co. was actually avoiding “immediate benefits” by refusing to
deal with Highlands.198 Furthermore, Ski Co. refused to accept tick-
et vouchers from its competitor despite simultaneously voluntarily
(and thus presumably profitably)199 accepting the same tickets from
other members of the public.200 While legitimate business reasons
can exist in a refusal to deal that turns down immediate benefits,
the Court made clear that a monopolist “forgo[ing] ... short-run ben-
efits because it was ... motivated entirely by a decision to avoid
providing any benefit to [a competitor]” violates Section 2.201
Trinko involved a complaint that Verizon, a local exchange carrier
regulated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,202 had “denied
interconnection services to rivals in order to limit entry.”203 Accord-
ing to the complaint, Verizon had discriminated against competing
local carriers when it did not grant them access to its local loop, and
thereby prevented them from potentially serving customers.204 But
before getting to the merits of the antitrust claim, the Court first
determined that Verizon was not given implied immunity from
antitrust scrutiny by the “detailed regulatory scheme” created by
the 1996 Act,205 as the Act included a provision specifically preclud-
ing an interpretation of implied immunity.206 Returning to the mer-
its, the Court referred to the anticompetitive activity in Aspen Ski-
ing as being “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability,”207 since
Ski Co.’s decisions to unilaterally terminate profitable prior deal-
ing with a competitor and to (against its own non-monopolistic self-
interest) refuse to sell its competitor’s goods that it otherwise held
available to the public were clear Section 2 violations.208 Unlike Ski
Co., Verizon had no prior course of dealing with its competitors and
198. Id. at 610. 
199. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004). For additional insight into the presumption of profitability, see infra notes 222-23.
200. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 609-10.
201. Id. at 608, 610.
202. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 401; see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2012)).
203. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
204. See id. at 404-05.
205. Id. at 406.
206. Id. (citing Telecommunications Act of 1996).
207. Id. at 409.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 191-98.
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did not offer the sought-after services to the public.209 Therefore, the
Court held that Verizon’s refusal to deal did not fall within the
“limited exception” to the right to refuse to deal established in As-
pen Skiing.210 
Furthermore, the Court in Trinko chose not to impose liability up-
on Verizon’s behavior by adding an exception to the general freedom
to refuse to deal211 because the FCC regulatory system overseeing
the industry was an “effective steward of the antitrust function”212
that was built into the regulatory structure for antitrust concerns.213
The final factor the Court considered was the practical ability of a
court to supervise any duty to deal it may impose: “No court should
impose a duty to deal that it cannot explain or adequately and rea-
sonably supervise. The problem should be deemed irremedia[ble] by
antitrust law when compulsory access requires the court to assume
the day-to-day controls characteristic of a regulatory agency.”214
D. The “No Economic Sense” Test Protects Brands from Violating
Section 2
Otter Tail, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko establish that the critical
determination in refusal-to-deal cases is whether the alleged exclu-
sionary conduct had a legitimate business purpose other than fur-
thering monopoly power.215 This determination has become known
209. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409-10.
210. See id. at 409. Further, courts should be “very cautious” in recognizing exceptions to
the general principle that firms have no obligation to deal due to the “uncertain virtue of
forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a
single firm.” Id. at 408.
211. See id. at 411.
212. Id. at 413.
213. When a
regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm ...
exists, the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement
will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws
contemplate such additional scrutiny. Where, by contrast, “[t]here is nothing
built into the regulatory scheme which performs the antitrust function,” the
benefits of antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.
Id. at 412 (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 358 (1963)).
214. Id. at 415 (quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting
Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 853 (1989)).
215. See supra Part IV.C.
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as the “no economic sense” test,216 and is the standard favored by
scholars, agencies, and courts.217 But what seems to make “economic
sense” can be imprecise and debatable, and therefore lead to differ-
ing interpretations on the outcome of antitrust liability for particu-
lar types of alleged exclusionary conduct.218 Merging the holdings
and rationales behind the Court’s evolution of the refusal-to-deal
doctrine in Otter Tail, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko, however, reveals
an analytical framework that should guide courts’ determinations
of whether brands’ refusal to share samples with generics in the
REMS context makes economic sense.
Otter Tail, Aspen Skiing, and Trinko identify three primary fac-
tors that inform courts whether the refusal to deal in the REMS
context has a valid business justification or is unlawful anticom-
petitive conduct.219 The first factor (and the one easiest to deter-
mine) is whether the monopolist and its competitor have engaged
in a prior course of dealing.220
1. Brand Manufacturers and Generic Competitors Have No
Prior Course of Dealing
In Aspen Skiing, the Court found liability in strong part because
Ski Co. had terminated its dealings with Highlands before engag-
ing in the disputed conduct.221 Due to its voluntary nature, a prior
216. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 34, at 27.
217. See id.
218. Differing scholarly opinions on the outcome of the no economic sense test are apparent
in this very issue surrounding brand manufacturers’ refusal to sell samples to generic
manufacturers under REMS. Compare Butler, supra note 9, at 980 (arguing that brands have
many legitimate business justifications for refusing to provide samples to generics), with Car-
rier, supra note 34, at 38-41 (arguing that brands’ denial of samples makes no economic
sense).
219. Brands’ refusal to provide generics with samples clearly constitutes the kind of ex-
clusionary conduct that would violate Section 2 absent a valid business reason; as a result of
brands’ decision to refuse to deal with generics, generics are unable to meet ANDA require-
ments and enter the market. See supra Part II. It is not possible for generics to obtain the
necessary sample of drugs through another source due to REMS regulations restricting access
to the drugs apart from authorization from the brand in accordance with methods defined by
the REMS program for that drug. See supra Part II.A.
220. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608, 610-11
(1985).
221. See id. at 593.
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course of dealing is presumably profitable.222 Thus, unilateral ter-
mination of the course of dealing and subsequent exclusionary
conduct by the monopolist is presumably unprofitable, excluding
profit derived from long-term anticompetitive gains. Therefore, a
course of dealing existing prior to the alleged exclusionary conduct
by itself “is sufficient, but not necessary, to show conduct that lacks
economic sense” and fails the test.223
Applying this first factor to REMS cases, when brand manufac-
turers refuse to deal with generic manufacturers and provide sam-
ples for generic ANDA testing, there should, in theory, never be a
preexisting relationship between the brand and the generic re-
garding provision of samples of the brand drug. This is because the
generic needs the brand drug samples to enter the market;224 if the
generic has not been in the market previously, there should be no
prior commercial relationship. And if the generic had previously
dealt with the brand for samples of the drug, it would no longer
need a sample. Although no prior course of dealing exists in REMS
refusal-to-deal cases, the absence of this factor does not preclude
antitrust liability by implying that the absence of dealing is
222. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
409 (2004); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 156 (1978) (“In any business,
patterns of distribution develop over time; these may reasonably be thought to be more
efficient than alternative patterns of distribution that do not develop. The patterns that do
develop and persist we may call the optimal patterns. By disturbing optimal distribution
patterns one rival can impose costs upon another, that is, force the other to accept higher
costs.”).
223. Carrier, supra note 34, at 51. In the vast majority of cases, this conclusion that a prior
course of dealing is profitable will likely prove correct. However, this Note’s author believes
that a prior course of dealing should not be an irrefutable indicator of economic sense. A long-
term contract creates a prior course of dealing that, while voluntary at its outset, may no
longer be profitable given changes in the market. Similarly, fluctuations in demand or in the
costs of inputs can cause a prior profitable course of dealing to suddenly become unprofitable.
Mere nonrenewal, or even an efficient breach, of a contract by a monopolist should not auto-
matically create a sufficient finding that a refusal to deal lacks economic sense. Therefore,
this Note contends that if a plaintiff alleging a refusal-to-deal violation shows a prior course
of dealing, the court should allow the defendant the opportunity to rebut the presumption of
profitability and lacking economic sense. This would be done by introducing evidence that
shows why the prior dealings were either involuntary and/or had recently become
unprofitable. While the third factor of the no-economic-sense test generally produces this
same type of evidence and the first two factors serve primarily as proxies for the third factor
anyway, see infra text accompanying notes 228-29, it is important to clarify that a legitimate
business justification should rebut any cessation of a prior course of dealing.
224. See supra Part II.
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profitable; as mentioned previously, prior dealing is a “sufficient, but
not necessary” factor.225
2. Brand Manufacturers Under REMS Regulation Do Not Make
Their Drugs Available to the Public
The second factor is whether the goods or services denied by the
monopolist to the plaintiff were otherwise made available to the
public.226 In both Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing, the monopolist “was
already in the business of providing a service to certain customers
... [but] refused to provide the same service to certain other custom-
ers.”227 This factor operates as a proxy for economic sense compara-
ble to that of the prior course of dealing228: that the monopolist is
willing to sell its goods or services to the public, but not to its com-
petitor, creates a logical presumption that the monopolist is leaving
profitable dealings on the table by its refusal to deal.229 The refus-
al to deal must apparently be “motivated entirely by a decision to
avoid providing any benefit to [its smaller competitor],”230 preclud-
ing legitimate business motivations in the refusal to deal, and there-
fore constituting a Section 2 antitrust violation.
At first glance, this factor seems to weigh heavily towards a result
of Section 2 liability falling upon brand drug manufacturers. Under
225. Carrier, supra note 34, at 51. This proposition is supported by Otter Tail, in which the
Court found Otter Tail’s exclusionary conduct violated Section 2 despite there being no prior
course of dealing, Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973), and by
Trinko, in which the Court continued its analysis even after finding there was no prior course
of dealing. See 540 U.S. at 409-10.
226. In Trinko, the Court distinguished the case before it from Otter Tail and Aspen Skiing
by noting that the defendants in those cases were refusing to deal with competitors as to
goods and services that they were otherwise holding out to public consumers. See Trinko, 540
U.S. at 410 (“In the present case, by contrast, the services allegedly withheld are not
otherwise marketed or available to the public.”). The Court emphasized this point by later
adding that the services requested from Verizon by its competitors were not only denied to the
public, but offering them to rivals would come at “considerable expense and effort. New
systems [would have to] be designed and implemented simply to make that access possible.”
Id. 
227. See id. (comparing the actions of Verizon to those of Otter Tail and Ski Co.).
228. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
229. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 (“The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus
presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits
to achieve an anticompetitive end.”).
230. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610 (1985).
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REMS and ETASU programming, many brands have contracted
with distributors to make their drug safely available to the public,
but have refused to sell their drug to their generic rivals.231 And
when a corporation turns down a proposal to sell at its own retail
price,” the presumption is that this decision could only be justified
by “a calculation that its future monopoly retail price would be
higher.”232 This straightforward analysis implies the kind of singu-
lar anticompetitive motivation that the Court has repeatedly held
violates Section 2.233 However, the REMS regulatory program intro-
duces several elements that warp any application of this second
factor to brands’ refusal to deal with generics.
Like Verizon’s services in Trinko, the products denied to generic
competitors are not available to the public, but are shared with se-
lect entities under obligations and restrictions governed by a reg-
ulatory scheme.234 Branded drugs under REMS are not marketed or
available to the public at all; they are only made available to select
distributors following extensive communication and planning re-
garding compliance with REMS safety requirements.235 Unlike Ski
Co.’s marketing scheme in Aspen Skiing, in which it “made a delib-
erate effort to discourage its customers from doing business with its
smaller rival,”236 brands do not make a deliberate effort to exclude
generics—they just make no deliberate efforts to include generics.
Additionally, drugs subject to ETASU require brands to conduct in-
tensive investigation on the purchaser before they can sell the drug,
in order to ensure safe handling of the drug.237 While the eventual
goal is to market the drugs to the consuming public, brands under
REMS are required to discriminatorily restrict their provision of
drugs.238 A brand’s decision to not provide generic competitors with
the brand drugs is arguably merely one of many calculated decisions
to refrain from providing others with their drugs due to safety and
liability concerns.
231. See supra text accompanying note 71.
232. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
233. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
234. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410; supra note 226.
235. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
236. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610 (1985).
237. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
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Additionally, implementing a REMS program is not cheap,239 and
there are many procedures to account for before the drug can be
distributed.240 As a result, requiring brands to work with generics
to supply generics with samples of REMS-regulated drugs would be
costly, and would require the companies to design and implement
new systems in a manner very similar to what the Court in Trinko
stated they did not want to occur.241 For these reasons, it becomes
much more difficult to discern whether a brand that refuses to deal
with a generic competitor is actually “sacrific[ing] short-run benefits
and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact
on its smaller rival.”242
Therefore, not only is the REMS-regulated drug more comparable
to the regulated services in Trinko not available to the public,243 but
brands’ frequent and required discrimination as to recipients of
their drug also significantly weakens the presumption that the re-
fusal to deal is only due to a motivation to harm the potential rival.
Unless a generic can proffer specific evidence that the brand’s refus-
al to deal is distinguishable from other discriminatory judgments
the brand makes in restricting access to its drugs due to anticom-
petitive motivations,244 this factor weighs against Section 2 liability
for refusals to deal tied to REMS.
239. See, e.g., Ameet Sarpatwari et al., Using a Drug-Safety Tool to Prevent Competition,
370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1476, 1476 (2014) (REMS are “sometimes criticized for being onerous
and costly to manufacturers”).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
241. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 410
(2004); supra note 226.
242. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985).
243. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
244. One way for generics to accomplish this without uncovering explicit indicia of
anticompetitive intent could be to introduce evidence that the brand has provided samples to
comparable but noncompeting research organizations. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 52.
However, inferring an anticompetitive motivation unto a brand for providing samples to
research organizations would likely result in the negative externality of diminishing research
organizations’ access to samples. It is therefore debatable whether courts should use this
evidentiary path to adjudge anticompetitive intent, even if such intent exists and would be
revealed through this approach.
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3. Fear of Tort Liability Serves as a Valid Business Reason for
Brands’ Refusals to Deal with Generics
The third factor the Court identified in its string of refusal-to-deal
precedent is whether the monopolist refused to deal for a valid busi-
ness reason, or refused with singularly anticompetitive intent.245
This third factor is the most important, but also the most compli-
cated factor to decipher. Ideally, the first or second factors would
serve as proxies to reveal the monopolist’s motivations and aid a
court in this determination. However, in the case of brand refusal-
to-deal under REMS, the first two factors have been largely in-
applicable.246 Applying this third factor to the REMS context, this
Note concludes that brands do currently have a valid business jus-
tification for their refusal to deal with their generic competitors:
legitimate concerns over potential tort liability—even if that lia-
bility is unlikely to be realized.
Within the REMS context specifically, brand drug samples turned
over to generics for testing can give rise to liability for the brand
manufacturer.247 Generics rely on the brand and its REMS program
to properly communicate the drug’s scientific and safety infor-
mation, and are required by the FDAAA to have an identical REMS
in place to the brand’s REMS.248 If injuries result from the generic
testing process, brands could be liable because, under REMS, a
REMS program creator and operator (the brand) is deemed
responsible for ensuring safety of the drug in testing and compliance
with REMS provisions when the drug is distributed.249 Pharmaceu-
tical product liability is not cheap in itself, but liability for violations
involving REMS drugs is particularly expensive; REMS violations
245. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1004-05 (“As ... reflected in all of the Supreme Court’s
refusal-to-deal cases, no refusal to deal by a monopolist is deemed anticompetitive for
purposes of antitrust liability if it is justified by ‘valid business reasons.’” (quoting Aspen
Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 597)).
246. See supra Parts IV.D.1-2.
247. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1007.
248. See Carrier, supra note 34, at 49.
249. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1007 (“Third parties’ failure to follow the meticulous
use provisions could result in liability litigation against the branded manufacturer.” (quoting
Glenn G. Lammi, Is FTC Becoming an All-Purpose Health Care Cost Regulator?, FORBES
(May 31, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2012/05/31/is-ftc-becoming-an-all-
purpose-health-care-cost-regulator)).
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can culminate in up to $10 million fines.250 Although a generic’s
safety and effectiveness testing “typically does not expose brands to
product liability claims because it ‘generally [does] not require[ ] ...
clinical (human) data’”251 under ANDA requirements,252 bioequiva-
lence is determined through human testing of the generic drug,253
often involving at least twenty-four to thirty-six individuals.254
REMS creates the legitimate potential for brands to incur signifi-
cant liability if they provide brand drug samples for generic testing.
Liability concerns also exist broadly across the pharmaceutical
industry for brands with generic competitors. Current tort and
product liability over brand and generic drugs reaffirms, for the
most part, the axiom that “a manufacturer of a product is not liable
for injuries to a user of another manufacturer’s product.”255 This
principle is known as competitor liability,256 and has widespread
support in courts across the nation.257 However, two recent Sup-
reme Court cases—Wyeth v. Levine258 and PLIVA, Inc. v. Men-
sing259—have cast doubts about the strength of this principle
against competitor liability in cases involving brand and generic
pharmaceuticals.260 While in Wyeth the Court held that injured
consumers could sue brand manufacturers for failing to warn about
the risks of taking brand drugs,261 PLIVA held that injured consum-
ers could not bring failure-to-warn claims for injuries caused by
250. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1006.
251. Carrier, supra note 34, at 59 n.397 (quoting Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA): Generics, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Development
ApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/Abbreviated
NewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/).
252. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-
Name Medicines When the Harm Was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs Has Severe Side
Effects, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1835, 1842-43 (2013).
253. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(2)(A)(iv), (j)(8) (2012).
254. Schwartz et al., supra note 252, at 1843.
255. Carrier, supra note 34, at 59 (quoting Kenneth Sills, Annotation, Liability of Name
Brand Drug Manufacturer for Injury or Death Resulting from Use of Prescription Drug’s
Generic Equivalent, 56 A.L.R. 6TH 161 (2010), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4be255
e7-0355-4edf-b732-Oe79c5bfc37a/?context=1000516).
256. See, e.g., Schwartz et al., supra note 252, at 1849.
257. See id. at 1852 (“[M]ore than sixty courts have rejected [competitor] liability.”).
258. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
259. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
260. See Schwartz et al., supra note 252, at 1852.
261. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 558-59.
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FDA-approved generic pharmaceuticals because the Court deter-
mined that generics had no control over the labels on their drugs.262
These two holdings have created an apparent “dichotomy” in liabil-
ity between brands and generics, in which claims against generic
manufacturers may be precluded when claims against brands are
not.263 While this does not overturn competitor liability,264 it en-
courages plaintiffs, as well as courts (likely motivated by equitable
concerns), to search for avenues to find brands liable even when the
product consumed was the generic version of the drug.265 One court
has already done just this: the Supreme Court of Alabama in Wyeth,
Inc. v. Weeks.266 In Weeks, the court held that a brand could be held
liable for fraud or misrepresentation made in connection with drug
labeling even when the consumer was injured by the generic version
of the drug.267 While Alabama remains an outlier,268 brands likely
see the decision as unlocking and opening Pandora’s Box, as their
expanded liability has been opened.269
Even if brands are never actually held liable again under com-
petitor liability, the mere risk of very costly liability has increased
dramatically.270 Now, every generic drug consumed has the realistic
potential of leading to liability for brands, which creates strong in-
centives for brands to minimize generic manufacture of their drug.
These incentives arise not because of prohibited monopolistic pricing
motivations, but because of legitimate business concerns about cost-
ly future tort and product liability (particularly if generic versions
262. See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 624. Generics are required to have identical labeling to that
of the brand drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012).
263. See Schwartz et al., supra note 252, at 1854, 1857.
264. See id. at 1857.
265. See id. at 1852.
266. 159 So. 3d 649 (Ala. 2014).
267. See id. at 676-77.
268. See Schwartz et al., supra note 252, at 1860 (“Overall, nearly two dozen courts have
assessed competitor liability theories since Mensing was decided. Other than the Supreme
Court of Alabama, all have held that Mensing does not alter state law principles that brand-
name drug manufacturers cannot be liable for harms caused by their generic competitors.”).
269. See Monee Hanna & Nicholas Janizeh, Innovator Liability: A Pandora’s Box For Phar-
ma Cos.?, LAW 360 (Apr. 2, 2018, 1:30: PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1028345 [https://
perma.cc/MN55-ZZEH].
270. See Weeks, 159 So. 3d at 685 (Murdock, J., dissenting) (commenting that the majority’s
decision to expand liability to brands “creates a precedent that poses danger for the pre-
scription-medicine industry and, by extension, for all industry”).
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of the brand’s drugs are consumed in Alabama).271 Furthermore,
brands are required by the NDA process to report on any significant
development in the scientific understanding of the drug, and to
change the labeling of the product if the safety or effectiveness of
the product changes.272 These monitoring, reporting, and labeling
requirements placed solely on the brand manufacturer extend past
the expiration of the brand’s patent and continue indefinitely so
long as a generic version remains in the market.273
This creates significant monitoring and potential liability costs
for brands that are unrelated to monopolistic pricing motivations
like those seen in Otter Tail274 or Aspen Skiing.275 Even though Otter
Tail also operated under a highly regulated industry,276 their
exclusionary activity was not tied to concerns over liability.277
Unlike Otter Tail, which “had already incurred the cost of the re-
quired infrastructure and, other than the ability to limit the
development of future rivals, would have nothing to lose from com-
plying with its regulatory obligation to ‘wheel’ the power of munici-
pal power providers,”278 brands face significant potential losses from
dealing with their competitors, and thus brands’ refusal to deal
makes economic sense.
4. Under Current Antitrust Doctrine, Brands’ Refusals to 
Deal with Generics Do Not Fail the “No Economic Sense”
Test
Absent the presence of a prior course of dealing (factor one), or
the availability of the product to the public but not a competitor (fac-
tor two), the standard under the “no economic sense” test of a legit-
imate business reason appears fairly difficult to meet. Apart from
the signals given by the proxy determinations of intent through
factors one and two, it is difficult to determine the motivation
271. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
272. See Schwartz et al., supra note 252, at 1844.
273. See id. at 1844-45 (citing 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.3(a)-(c) (2018)).
274. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1973).
275. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604 (1985).
276. Butler, supra note 9, at 994.
277. See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 378.
278. Butler, supra note 9, at 994.
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behind a refusal to deal. Faced with this arduous task, courts rea-
sonably have placed the burden of proving anticompetitive intent
upon the plaintiff.279 This is consistent with the tone the Court has
struck regarding the established right of firms to refuse to deal, and
the Court’s views on monopolists in general. In Aspen Skiing, the
Court noted the “high value that we have placed on the right to
refuse to deal with other firms,”280 and reminded courts that “even
a firm with monopoly power has no duty to engage ... with a com-
petitor.”281 A refusal to deal in itself does not have “evidentiary
significance”282 apart from an additional showing of monopolistic
intent.283 Because the opportunity to acquire and possess monopoly
power “induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic
growth,” the Court has expressed the desire to “safeguard” legal mo-
nopolies by only imposing liability when there is anticompetitive
conduct with anticompetitive intent;284 “it is necessary to prove a
‘specific intent’ to accomplish the forbidden [monopolistic] objec-
tive.”285 Although the need to prove monopolistic intent itself cre-
ates a high bar for finding antitrust liability,286 a legitimate, non-
anticompetitive business reason behind the alleged exclusionary
action remains the best defense, as a valid business purpose “will
generally succeed in defending even a suspicious refusal to deal
against an alleged antitrust violation.”287
While brands that refuse to sell their REMS-regulated drug sam-
ples to generics are electing to forgo the short-run benefits of a sale,
brands are doing so for the long-run business reason of minimizing
279. In Actelion v. Apotex, a case dealing with a REMS refusal-to-deal, the court stated that
if the defendants can prove that the plaintiffs are “motivated not so much by safety concerns
but instead ... by the desire to use [REMS] ... to maintain and extend a monopoly,” then
Section 2 liability is in order. Carrier, supra note 34, at 14 (quoting Transcript of Motions
Hearing at 116, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05743, 2013 WL 5524078 at
*117 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013)).
280. Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 601.
281. Id. at 600.
282. Id. at 585.
283. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
284. Id.
285. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 602.
286. See Butler, supra note 9, at 1000.
287. Id. (citing Areeda, supra note 214, at 852).
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costly tort and product liability claims.288 There is no “prior conduct”
by the brands that would “shed[ ] light upon the motivation of its
refusal to deal,” and thus courts must defer to a shown legitimate
business reason for the refusal to deal and not impute “anticom-
petitive malice” to the monopolist.289 Therefore application of the “no
economic sense” test in the REMS context reveals that, absent an
evidentiary showing of monopolistic motivation superseding a
legitimate business reason, there are legally insufficient antitrust
concerns to impose Section 2 liability upon brand manufacturers for
refusing to deal with their generic competitors.
V. COURTS SHOULD CREATE A NEW EXCEPTION TO THE REFUSAL-
TO-DEAL DOCTRINE TO IMPOSE LIABILITY UPON BRANDS
Brands should not face Section 2 liability in the REMS context
under current refusal-to-deal doctrine because their refusal to deal
with generic competitors makes economic sense.290 However, the
Court in Trinko noted that if “traditional antitrust principles justi-
fy adding the present case to the few existing exceptions” to the
general right to refuse to deal with competitors, then courts should
create a new exception and impose antitrust liability.291 In analyzing
whether a new exception is appropriate, the crux of the Court’s
determination centered on whether the regulatory structure over-
seeing the monopolist’s behavior “was an effective steward of the
antitrust function.”292 If the regulatory structure was already “de-
signed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm,” then there
would be no need for additional antitrust review, as “the additional
benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend
to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust laws
contemplate such additional scrutiny.”293
Brand refusals to deal with generics due to REMS is an appropri-
ate context for courts to create a new exception to the right of refus-
al to deal. First, the FDAAA did not create a “regulatory structure
288. See supra Part IV.D.3.
289. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
290. See supra Part IV.D.4.
291. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
292. Id. at 413.
293. Id. at 412.
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designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm”294 resulting
from REMS.295 Section 355-1(f)(8) of the FDAAA auspices to act as
a “[l]imitation” on REMS, stating that “[n]o holder of an approved
covered application shall use any [ETASU] required by the
Secretary under this subsection to block or delay approval of an
[ANDA] application.”296 However, the language in § 355-1(f)(8) “does
not construe the type of conduct that is considered to block or delay,
nor does it include penalties for violations,”297 and the FDAAA as a
whole “provides no direction” on “whether and to what extent the
FDA has any authority” to enforce this section.298
While the FDA has repeatedly written that brand manufacturers
may not use REMS “to block or delay approval of an [ANDA],”299 the
FDA has been reluctant to elaborate upon what the aforementioned
blocking or delaying approval looks like in practice within a brand’s
operation of its REMS program.300 Even if § 355-1(f)(8) was designed
to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, it does not do so in
practice. The FDA seems to think that it has no clear authority to
punish anticompetitive behavior,301 and thus is an ineffective stew-
ard of any antitrust function within the FDAAA, if it exists.
Comparing the FDA and the FDAAA regulatory scheme to that
in Trinko further reveals how lacking the FDAAA is in creating an
antitrust function to govern REMS cases. The regulatory framework
in Trinko “significantly diminishe[d] the likelihood of major anti-
trust harm”302 by requiring Verizon to be “on good [competitive]
behavior” in its local market and to satisfy a “competitive checklist”
before it could enter the long-distance market regulated by the
FCC.303 But there is no such requirement of prior pro-competitive
294. Id.
295. See supra Parts I.B., III.B.
296. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(8) (2012).
297. Paradise, supra note 30, at 61.
298. Id. at 68-69; see supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
299. Butler, supra note 9, at 984 (quoting Letter from Judith A. Racoosin, Deputy Dir. for
Safety, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Beth Connelly, Assoc. Dir. Regulatory Affairs,
Purdue Pharma L.P., supra note 299).
300. See supra note 11.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21, 130.
302. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412
(2004) (quoting Town of Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990)).
303. Id. at 412.
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conduct required from brands to enter NDA and REMS program-
ming. The Court in Trinko also looked for specific evidence that the
regulatory framework was effective in practice, and deemed ex-
amples from the regulatory response to the alleged antitrust vio-
lation by Verizon relevant to determine whether the regulatory
framework necessitated judicial intervention over antitrust mat-
ters.304 Noting that the FCC and the New York Public Service
Commission “responded” to the antitrust complaints, “concluded”
that Verizon had violated the regulatory provision, and then “im-
posed” penalties and remedial reporting requirements, the Court
found that the regulatory structure had effectively performed its
designated antitrust function.305 In the REMS context, however, the
FDA has inconsistently responded to anticompetitive claims by ge-
nerics regarding alleged REMS abuses.306 The FDA has not con-
cluded that a brand was in breach of the FDAAA for its failure to
share drug samples with generics, despite the language of § 355-
1(f)(8) possibly giving the FDA grounds to find otherwise.307 While
“generic manufacturers’ dissatisfaction with the pace and level of
FDA action is not an argument that the agency is failing to actively
regulate,”308 the FDA has in fact gone beyond failing to regulate; it
has attempted to shift all resolution of the antitrust elements of ge-
nerics’ claims (and possible imposition of penalties) against brands
for their refusal to provide samples to the FTC.309
Even under a Trinko analysis that is rightfully “cautious” in
creating new exceptions to the right to refuse to deal with competi-
tors,310 the FDA is not serving as an effective steward of the anti-
trust function. As a result, there have been over 100 claims made by
generics against brands for anticompetitively refusing to provide
304. See id. at 413.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 34, at 49 n.366 (“FDA sometimes ‘sat on ... [letter]
requests for years and never responded to them.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript
of Motions Hearing at 57, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-05743, 2013 WL
5524078, at *117 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013))).
307. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
308. Butler, supra note 9, at 1002.
309. See supra Part III.C.
310. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408 (“We have been very cautious in recognizing such exceptions
[to the refusal-to-deal right], because of the uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the
difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.”).
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them samples of drugs,311 but none have been resolved by the FDA
using its regulatory authority by punishing the brand’s anticom-
petitive behavior and requiring the brand to sell the samples to the
generic. Traditional antitrust principles are endangered by brands’
refusal to provide samples to generics, which thwarts competition
by preventing generics from completing the ANDA process and
entering the pharmaceutical market.312 In regulating REMS pro-
visions, the FDA is focused on ensuring safety, not competition.313
Because the FDA has not been an effective steward of the FDAAA
regarding alleged REMS abuses,314 the benefits of imposing judici-
al antitrust scrutiny are significant.315
Congress and the FDA have essentially abandoned generic man-
ufacturers in their quest to complete the ANDA process and enter
the market. But that does not mean courts are bound to do likewise.
Although brands’ refusals to deal with their generic competitors
does not implicate established exceptions to the right of firms to
refuse to deal, “[a]ntitrust analysis must always be attuned to the
particular [regulatory] structure and circumstances of the industry
at issue.”316 While the regulatory scheme surrounding REMS and
the pharmaceutical industry at large is extensive, it has not served
as an effective steward of antitrust principles.317 Building on a line
of other Supreme Court cases, notably Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange,318 Trinko established that courts could impose antitrust
scrutiny and liability when traditional antitrust principles justify
its implementation because the current regulatory framework is
not, in design or in practice, remedying major antitrust harm.319
Therefore, to properly enforce the traditional antitrust principles
that establish and empower Section 2, courts should not turn a blind
eye to brands’ anticompetitive manipulation of REMS. Instead,
courts should create a new exception to the refusal-to-deal doctrine
311. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part II.
313. See supra Part I.B.
314. See supra Parts III.A-B.
315. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412.
316. Id. at 411.
317. See supra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
318. See 373 U.S. 341, 358-59 (1963).
319. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411-13.
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for brands’ refusal to share samples due to asserted REMS justifica-
tions. Failing to do so would “defeat the congressional policy reflec-
ted in the antitrust laws”320 while also defeating the procompetitive
purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act.321
CONCLUSION
Brand drug manufacturers have manipulated REMS to engage
in anticompetitive behavior that undermines the purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act and hurts the public interest by preventing the
entry to market of generic competitors.322 Congress has given indi-
cations of its intent to make REMS abuses of this nature unlawful,
both through § 355-1(f)(8) of the FDAAA and subsequent attempts,
but has as of yet failed to do so.323 The FDA has been likewise pas-
sive in responding to generics’ concerns about brands’ use of REMS
to shield their anticompetitive behavior from regulatory scrutiny.324
While current refusal-to-deal doctrine does not support imposing an-
titrust liability upon brands’ use of REMS to restrict generics from
accessing samples of brand drugs,325 the ineffectiveness of the reg-
ulatory structure overseeing REMS creates a need for courts to in-
tervene and apply antitrust scrutiny to prevent further significant
anticompetitive harm.326
Until Congress intervenes and makes brand refusal to provide
samples to generics due to asserted REMS concerns explicitly
unlawful, or clarifies the FDA’s power to regulate and punish
anticompetitive uses of REMS, a vacuum of antitrust scrutiny will
continue to exist in the pharmaceutical industry. Guided by Trinko
and public policy,327 courts should apply traditional antitrust
principles in the area of REMS regulation and impose antitrust
320. Silver, 373 U.S. at 360.
321. See supra Part I.A.
322. See supra Part II.
323. See supra Part III.A.
324. See supra Part III.B.
325. See supra Part IV.
326. See supra Part V.
327. See supra Part V.
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liability upon brands’ anticompetitive refusals to provide samples to
generics.
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